

(Chrono)
(Congressional)
(SSCI))

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


Senior Review Panel

NIC 03713-85
24 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Chief, Intelligence Producers Council
Staff

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Responses to
Questions from the Senate Select
Committee for Intelligence (SSCI)

Attached are the subject responses to questions
raised by the SSCI upon the occasion of the DCI's
testimony at the hearing on National Intelligence
Strategy, 19 June 1985. As requested, the answer to
Question 5 was coordinated with the Product Evaluation
Staff.



25X1

Attachment

ODCI/SRP/HCR:jsb

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Addressee
- 1 - SRP File
- 1 - SRP Chrono



25X1

~~SECRET~~



25X1

SECRET

25X1

NIC 03713-85
24 July 1985

Senior Review Panel Responses to Questions Raised
By the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
On 19 June 1985

5. Generally speaking, what are the criteria by which you judge the quality of intelligence? Please be specific. Are these criteria weighted differently in different situations? Given these criteria, how well is the Intelligence Community measuring up? Have you conveyed these specific criteria to the CIA's Product Evaluation Staff? Does the Product Evaluation Staff use these criteria in its own work?

Answer

In its assessments of Community Production the Senior Review Panel has established a number of criteria for judging intelligence quality and utility. Except under special circumstances these criteria are not given specific quantitative weights and no attempt is made to attach numerical grades to individual intelligence products. The Panel's judgments are collegial, after its members apply these criteria individually, independently, and subjectively, and alter their relative weight assignments (subjective and approximate) in accordance with the nature and purpose of the intended intelligence publication. The Panel reviews proposals for new National Estimates in their initial stage (Concept Papers and Terms of Reference) and in one or more successive drafts generally from the standpoint of adequacy to policymaker needs. The following basic criteria form a first filter for quality:

- (a) Relevance to an identified policy issue or an emerging trend of significance for US policy.
- (b) Timeliness in providing an input to a policy decision or a review of existing US policy.
- (c) Conciseness in expressing its judgments.
- (d) Clarity in its presentation.
- (e) Completeness in covering the principal policy-relevant issues, addressing the main intelligence questions bearing on them, and using all available intelligence.
- (f) Logic and Consistency in its development of arguments from basic intelligence data to final judgments.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Additionally, several further criteria are used to distinguish the excellent from the acceptable study:

- (a) The extent to which the level of confidence in its judgments is clearly communicated.
- (b) The degree to which alternative, reasonably likely, outcomes are examined, the developments which would lead to them identified, and the odds on their occurrence estimated.
- (c) The provision of a set of intelligence indicators which can be used to follow the continuing unrolling of events, and of intelligence gaps.
- (d) The balance between speculation and hard fact in the analysis, and the extent to which the two are distinguished.
- (e) The clear exposition of the assumptions used.
- (f) The adequacy with which dissenting views are presented, their bases explained, differing evidence or interpretations set out, and their implications projected.

The Panel believes that on the whole the jointly produced products of the Intelligence Community (NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, IIAs) measure up well against these criteria. The quality of these products is at its highest point in recent years, if not in the entire history of the Intelligence Community.

The Production Evaluation Staff is aware of the criteria used by the Panel in its review of National Estimates.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

6. What evidence does the Intelligence Community actually have to show that the intelligence it produces today is better than the intelligence that was produced five years ago? Better than 20 years ago? Is any record kept on the consumers' responses to the quality of this intelligence over these periods?

Answer

The Senior Review Panel reviewed all joint products of the Intelligence Community (NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, IIAs) for the period 1977 through 1984, and compared the quality of those products issued in the second half of that period with those produced in the first half, using the criteria described in the answer to Question 5, above. The results of that study were presented to the DCI in a memorandum dated 24 May 1985 (copy provided). The overall findings are best encapsulated by the concluding paragraph of that study.

"19. Summing up our inquiry into the Phase I and Phase II periods, we conclude that, while further improvements remain to be made, the national estimates underwent far-reaching and significant change, amounting to a virtual transformation of the product. In Phase II, coverage was broader, more consistently applied, better timed and coordinated with decision points, and more attuned to the entire range of critical issues facing policymakers. Alterations in format and style much improved the quality of communication between analysis and consumer. The anticipatory and predictive content of estimates markedly increased; reactive and retrospective analysis receded. And a new generation of broadly-ranging, strategic estimates, without precedent in Phase I, opened newer perspectives for national intelligence support of the policymaking process."

No specifically comparative study covering a 20-year period has been carried out, although the review referred to in the answer to Question 7 bears on the problem. The Panel does not maintain a record of consumers' responses to the quality of this intelligence for these periods.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

7. In your testimony, you said that you had the Senior Review Panel study "how and why the Intelligence Community had over the last two decades failed to call (and) identify critical turning points accurately in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Iran, in Nicaragua, in Afghanistan before the invasion at the time of the Communist takeover and a couple of other kinds of critical turning points."
- a. We would appreciate your furnishing this study to the Committee.
 - b. Have you commissioned similar studies by the Senior Review Panel to investigate any intelligence failures that may have occurred since 1980? If so, we would appreciate copies of these studies as well. If such studies have not been commissioned, then why?

Answers

- a. Copy furnished.
- b. The Panel's 24 May 1985 report is responsive to this question.

SECRET

25X1